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NOTES
COMPETENCY OF HUSBAND OR WIFE TO TESTIFY
TO NON-ACCESS TO ESTABLISH ADULTERY
Under the statute providing for divorce, the innocent and injured spouse
may obtain a divorce from the bond of matrimony whenever it shall be judged
that the other spouse has committed adultery.1 Because adultery is usually committed under clandestine circumstances, it is difficult to prove. Consequently, as a
general rule, it is sufficient to prove adulterous inclination and opportunity to carry
out that inclination. 2 However, where the respondent who is being charged with
lAct of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237; 23 P. S. section 10.
2
Amman v. Amman, 90 Pa. Super. 25 (1926) ; Pierpoint v. Pierpoint, 108 Pa. Super. 108, 164
At. 808 (,1933); Yocum v. Yocum, 3 Pa. Dist. 615 (1894); Graham v. Graham, 153 Pa. 450, 25
Atd. 766 (1893); Yost v. Yost, 14 Schuyl. 336; Stewart v. Stewart, 85 Pa. Super. 41 (1925);
Reighter v. Reighter, 58 Pa. Super. 636 (1915); McCune v. McCune, 31 Pa. Super. 248 (1906);
Gruninger v. Gruninger, 190 Pa. 633, 43 Ati. 128 (1899); Cook v. Cook, 85 Pa. Super. 403
(1925); Davis v. Davis, 91 Pa. Super. 354 (1933); Price v. Price, 69 Pitts. 479; see Sturgeon on
Divorce. section 323; Freedman on Divorce, section 194. All these cases recognize that direct
evidence is not necessary to prove adultery.
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adultery is the wife, the strongest proof of her adultery is the birth of a child which
must have been conceived in the absence of her husband. It should be noted here
that the mere birth of a child to a married woman does not of course raise a presumption of adultery. Rather, the presumption is that a child born during marriage, whether begotten prior or subsequent to marriage, is legitimate and can be
bastardized only on proof that there was no sexual intercourse between the parents
at the time when the child must have been conceived. 3 The rule is expressed best
4
in the words of Cardozo, Ch. J.,
"Countervailing evidence may shatter the presumption, though the
possibility of access is not susceptible of exclusion to the point of
utter demonstration. . . . Issue will not be held legitimate by a sacrifice of probabilities in a futile quest for certainty."
It is in connection with this rule that the incapacity of a husband or wife to
testify to non-access tending to bastardize the issue arose. Lord Mansfield first
laid down the rule in Goodright v. Moss;5
"The testimony of a father or mother cannot be admitted to bastardize the issue born after marriage. It is a rule, founded in decency,
morality, and policy, that they shall not be permitted to say after
marriage that they have had no connection, and therefore that the
offspring is the offending party."
This rule has been accepted in the United States and is supported by the great
weight of authority.6 Pennsylvania 7 is in line with the weight of authority. The
rule had been touched upon in many early Pennsylvania cases,' and was stated
definitely in lanes' Estate.9 In that case it was said that:
"A presumption of legitimacy attaches to birth in wedlock, and it
cannot be rebutted by the testimony of the mother or of her husband.
It may be overcome by proof of non-access of the husband, but they
are not competent to establish it. The proof must come from another source. But the mothtr is competent to prove the time of her
marriage, and when her child was born."
3Com. v. Shepherd, 6 Binney 283 (1814) ; Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420, 423 (1857).
4In re Findlay, 253 N. Y. 1, 170 N. E. 471 (1930); Dulsky v. Susquehanna Collieries Co.,
116 Pa. Super. 520, 177 At. 60 (1935); Com. v. Dimatteo, 124 Pa. Super. 277, 188 At. 425
(1936) ; see Freedman on Divorce, section 199, p. 495.
62 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777); 11 Eng. Rul. Cas. 518; Com. ex rel Moska v.
Moska, 107 Pa. Super. 75, 162 Ad. 343 (1932).
GWallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N. W. 527 (1908); Taylor v. Whittier et al (Mass.),
138 N. E. 6 (1922); Timman v. Timman, 142 N. Y. Sup. 298, 31 N. E. 113 (1913); Jane's
Estate, 147 Pa. 527 (1892) ; Tioga County v. South Creek Twp., 75 Pa. 433 (1874) ; Dennison V.
PWge, 7 29 Pa. 420 (1851).
Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420 (1851), cited supra note 6.
STioga County v. South Creek Twp., 75 Pa. 433 (1874).
9Jane's Estate, 147 Pa. 527 (1892), cited supra note 6.
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Thus the rule seems to be well settled in Pennsylvania, but only in those
cases in which the legitimacy of children is directly in issue. However, whether
this rule will be adopted in divorce cases in Pennsylvania where adultery is the
main issue, is in doubt, for there is no appellate decision as yet, and the lower
court cases are in conflict. In Peters v. Peters,10 the court, after repeating the
rule as applied in cases where legitimacy of children is directly in issue, went on
to hold that:
"We think, however, that the same consideration of public policy
requires its application in divorce cases. To permit the proof of
adultery by such evidence in a divorce proceeding would not merely
be subject to the objections stated in the cases cited, but would open
wide the door to collusion and fraud."
Again in Coyles v. Coyles,11 although a divorce was granted, the court rejected
the testimony of the husband and wife as to non-access, applying the rule as in the
case where legitimacy of children is directly in issue.
On the other hand, in Thompson v. Thompson,12 the question arose as to
whether thL testimony of witnesses who testified as to respondent's admission, viz:
that her husband, the libellant, was not the father of her child, and the court held:
"This is an action which does not relate to the legitimacy of the
children but to the adulterous practices of the respondent and what
she has admitted relating thereto is admissible. If the child were
a party to this issue and its paternity were involved, the rule that the
testimony would be inadmissible due to the incompetency of the
parents to testify as to non-access might prevail. But that is not the
issue; it is that of the adulterous practices of the respondent."
This same reasoning is found in Allison v. Allison,' 8 another lower court case,
where the husband testified to non-access to his wife for six months before they
separated. There, the court said,
"The testimony admitted was not for the purpose of affecting in any
way the rights or legitimacy of the child that was born to the respondent but simply as bearing upon the right of the libellant to his
divorce on the ground of his wife's unfaithfulness."
Still other lower court cases have adopted this reasoning and rejected the rule
14
forbidding the husband or wife to testify to non-access.
104 D. & C. 287 (1923) ; Kleinert v. Ehlers, 38 Pa. 439 (1861).
1126 Pa. Dist. 816 (1916).
1228 Dauph. Co. Rep. 73, 31 Dauph. Co. Rep. 330.
1861 Pitts. Legal Journal 101.
14Pasquarelle v. Pasquarelle, 18 Pa. Dist. 526 (1907) ; 36 Pa. C. C. 513; 21 A. L. R. 1457;
Corcoran, 73 Pitts. Legal Journal 511.
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Whether this rule as established should be extended is a question which can
correctly be answered only by looking at the reasons for its origin and the purposes
it has served. Before its enunciation by Lord Mansfield in Goodright v. Aoss, 15
no such rule prohibiting the husband and wife from testifying to non-access existed.
Indeed, the only rule of this nature serving to incapacitate the husband and wife
was the well-settled one which forbade either spouse from testifying for or against
the other. What, then, gave rise to the rule, which has received such wide support?
16
It seems that the rule arose as a result of an utterance by Lord Mansfield,
an utterance not necessary to the decision of the case, but merely dictum, for which,
it appears, no authority whatever was given.' 7 It was repeated with approval,
very likely because it was the opinion of Lord Mansfield, and has come to be accepted both in England and the United States, having even been xtended to
divorce cases in England by the Russell v. Russell case.' 8 Such is the origin of this
doctrine-a rather inauspicious on'e. Even less has been said for the reasons which
have been given in support of the rule. It has been strongly criticized by judges in
dissenting opinions of cases which have upheld the doctrine. But it has been mosi
strongly and effectively criticized by Professor Wigmore. 19
The rule, as stated, seems to be based wholly on the ground of decency,
morality, and policy. In the words of Professor Wigmore,
"Why is such a fact indecent, immoral, or impolitic? There is nothing indecent in asking a wife whether her husband was in Texas
from 1920 to 1925 during the time she was in Maine, nor is it indecent to ask whether during that time she lived with the alleged
adulterer. In every sort of action whatever, a wife may testify to
adultery or a single woman to illicit intercourse. Yet the one fact
singled out as indecent is the fact of non-access on the part of I
husband. Such an inconsistency is obviously untenable."
The opinion of Gordon, J., in Tioga County v. South Creek Township, 8 has
generally been cited for reasons best supporting the rule. It was there said:
"The admission of such testimony would be unseemly and scandalous,
and this not so much from the fact that it reveals immoral conduct
upon the part of the parents as because of the effect it may have
upon the child, who is in no fault, but who must nevertheless be the
chief sufferer thereby. That the parents should be permitted to
152 Cowp. 591 (1777), cited supra note 5.
162 Cowp. 591 (1777), cited supra note 5.
17

1n making this statement no cases were cited by Lord Mansfield.

18A. C. 687 (1924) ; Freedman on Divorce, section 199, p. 498.
19Wigmore
on Evidence, vol. 3, sect. 2063, p. 2767.
2
OTioga County v. South Creek Twp., 75 Pa. 433 (1874); cited supra note 6.
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bastardize the child is a proposition which shocks our sense of right
and decency."
Again Professor Wigmore2 l severely and effectively criticizes these reasons.
Of the opinion of Gordon, J., in the Tioga Count) case, he says:
"There is an immorality and a scandal we are told in allowing married parents to bastardize their children. And yet, they may lawfully
commit this same immorality by any sort of testimony whatever except
to the fact of non-access. They may testify that there was no marriage ceremony, or that the child was born b'efore marriage, or that
the one party was already married to a third person or their hearsay
declaration (after death) to illegitimacy in general may be used. In
all these other ways they may lawfully do the mean act of helping to
bastardize their own children born after marriage."
Professor Wigmore's criticism of the rule clearly and simply indicates the unsoundness of the reasoning behind the rule. He has, it seems, removed the last
vestige of any possible reason which could support the doctrine. In this he is
joined by many able jurists who cannot reconcile themselves to any justification of
the rule. A good example is to be found in the dissenting opinion written by
Rush, J.,
in Dennison v. Page,2 2 which upheld the doctrine. Judge Rush said:
"To admit a married woman upon inquiry into the legitimacy of a
child born in the absence of her husband, to swear that she lived in
adultery, which she must do when she swears that there was no marriage between her and the putative father, and at the same time te
say that she shall not give evidence that her husband had no access
to her, because the evidence would be indecent seems rather mysterious and incomprehensible."
The rule seems to be seriously wanting of logic. On the face of it, it appears
that the application of the rule depends wholly upon whether or not a child is born
from the illicit connection. Yet no adequate explanation has been given for the
distinction. Lord Carson, writing a dissenting opinion in the Russell v. Russell 2 8
case, suggests still another problem which the rule raises. He asks: "Would the
evidence be inadmissible if the child had been stillborn, or if no child had been
born but the mother had a miscarriage which would equally prove the adultery?"
Or, suppose a child had been born but had died before the case had come to trial?
Such problems serve only to indicate more clearly that the rule is without logic.
glWigmore
on Evidence, vol. 5, sect. 2063, p. 2767, cited supra note 19.
22

Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420 (1851); cited supra note 6.
23A. C. 687 (1924), cited supra note 18. He was joined by Lord Sumner, who also wrote a
strong dissenting opinion.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Finally, Professor Freedman, in his treatise on Divorce, 24 very ably summarizes
the problem in a few words. He says:
"The legitimacy of the child is not involved and the issue simply is
whether the respondent was guilty of adultery. The rule should be
no different in the case where a husband is an eyewitness to an act
of adultery by his wife, which results in the birth of a child. The
shame upon the child is no greater, and indeed cannot stand in the
way of the administration of justice. The illegitimacy of the child,
however it may come to be doubted by the world, is not in law
established or even affected. The weight of reason, therefore, supports the decisions which declare that the incompetency of the spouse
to testify to non-access does not apply in divorce proceedings."
CONCLUSION

As already mentioned above, this rule is well entrenched in the law of England and this country. Pennsylvania supports it unquestionably in those cases
where the legitimacy of a child is in issue. However, the criticisms of many
eminent jurists have demonstrated the unsoundness of the rule, and have cast
considerable doubt upon its efficacy. That this has been recognized is to be seen
in the decisions of many recent cases. Outstanding among them is a recent New
Jersey case. 25 The court in that case, recognizing the attempted justification of the
rule to be wholly inadequate, rejected it and ruled that the testimony of either
parent as to non-access would be admitted. The judge pointed out in his opinion,
as many others have before him, that if it is not immoral, indecent, or impolitic
for either spouse to testify against the other to prove adulterous inclination and
opportunity to commit adultery, then it is not so to testify to non-access. Indeed,
were the reasoning behind this rule to be logically carried out, practically every bit
of testimony in a divorce suit brought on the grounds of adultery could be objected
to as being immoral, indecent, and impolitic! Absurd as this may seem, it is,
nevertheless, not a far cry from the present rule, and its reasoning.
Many other recent cases holding similarly to the New Jersey case are to be
found in the reports of various states. 26 In those cases, statutes were held to have
abrogated Lord Mansfield's rule and the testimony of the husband or wife was
held admissible. So far there has been a rigid adherence to the rule by the courts,
24Freedman on Divorce, section 199, p. 502, cited supra note 18.
25Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N. J. Eq. 242, 168 Atl. 840 (1933). Thet court in that caec Said:
"We feel that the rule leads to the suppression of the truth and the defeat of justice. We therefore
decline to adopt the Lord Mansfield rule."
2eState v. Sayler, 181 Minn. 553, 233 N. W. 300 (1930); In re Wray, 93 Mont. 525, 19
Pac. (2d) 1051 (1933); People v. Dykeman, 225 App. Div. 751, 241 N. Y. Supp. 343 (1930);
Public Welfare Comm. v. Zizzo, 236 App. Div. 813, 260 N. Y. Supp. 169 (1932); Adams v.
Adams, 102 Vt. 318, 148 At. 287 (1930). See for additional cases, 89 A. L. R. 911.
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but it is submitted that further recognition of the inefficacy of the rule, should and
will likely be forthcoming in the future. Often has it been said that when the
reason for a rule ceases to exist, the rule ceases. It might well be urged, then, that
this is a rule for which no good reason exists, and which therefore should cease.
WILLIAM

BATRUS

THE EFFECT OF INSURANCE ON FAULT WITHOUT LIABILITY
It is the purpose of this note to determine the effect of insurance on the
various phases of tort law where, in consideration of public policy, no recovery
is generally allowed. The validity of the various theories and arguments for
imposing or not imposing liability so far as they do not consider the element of
insurance is immaterial to the writer. It is the writer's purpose to accept the existing rules of the law in the various jurisdictions and apply to them the influence of insurance. In short then, should or should not the fact that the defendant charity, municipality, parent, child or spouse is protected adequately by insurance produce a different result?
Apropos to the discussion, we should keep in mind the extremely wide
spread use of insurance in all forms. It is not amiss to state that the old phrase,
"There is a remedy for -every wrong," may safely be replaced by a more effectual
one, "There is insurance for every wrong." If this fundamental concept of the
purpose of insurance be given its full and entitled office, its effect will be tremendous. Completely intertwined with the increased use of insurance is the ever
mounting number of automobiles using our highways daily. The majority of
cases cited in this note arose from alleged negligence in the operation of such
vehicles.
While many reasons are assigned by the courts for refusing recovery, the
basic reason behind all of the holdings is public policy. The public policy
reasoning generally breaks down into two classes, the trust fund theory and the
family dispute theory. Under the trust fund theory there are two branches, the
eleemosynary institutions and municipalities. These will be discussed together.
THE TRUST FUND THEORY

The basic principle behind these cases is that the fund should be used only
for charitable or municipal purposes and to permit its divergence for any other
use would be to vitiate the primary aim. Conceding, for a working premise, that
this is sound, it would appear that when such institutions carry insurance to
protect themselves from liability incurred by the torts of their servants, they are
in effect recognizing the harshness of the rule, waiving their exemption and cre-

